Within feminist literature from the early 1970s to this day, assisted reproductive technologies have been largely known to divide, replace or eliminate biological motherhood. For example, while in the past biological motherhood was considered a continuous experience, in vitro fertilisation (IVF) and IVF using egg donation allowed a split between two biological mothers, one providing eggs (genetic mother) and the other one gestation (gestational mother). This split was considered irreparable: the genetic mother could not be also gestational, and vice versa. (...) On the contrary, this paper aims to show that assisted reproductive technologies may also have a constructive potential towards biological motherhood(s). To explain how it could be possible, two existing techniques are explored: the first is maternal spindle transfer, which allows a double genetic motherhood; the second is reciprocal effortless IVF, which supposedly enables a double gestational motherhood. While in the first part, these techniques are examined singularly, in the second part a feasible combination of them is speculated. The idea is that assisted reproductive technologies could ‘recombine’ genetic and gestational motherhood in two figures that include both, namely in two ‘complete’ biological mothers, both genetic and gestational. (shrink)

Recently, a number of philosophers have begun to question the commonly held view that choice or voluntary control is a precondition of moral responsibility. According to these philosophers, what really matters in determining a person’s responsibility for some thing is whether that thing can be seen as indicative or expressive of her judgments, values, or normative commitments. Such accounts might therefore be understood as updated versions of what Susan Wolf has called “real self views,” insofar as they attempt to ground (...) an agent’s responsibility for her actions and attitudes in the fact (when it is a fact) that they express who she is as a moral agent. As such, they seem to be open to some of the same objections Wolf originally raised to such accounts, and in particular to the objection that they cannot license the sorts of robust moral assessments involved in our current practices of moral responsibility. My aim in this paper is to try to respond to this challenge, by clarifying the kind of robust moral assessments I take to be licensed by (at least some) non-volitional accounts of responsibility and by explaining why these assessments do not in general require the agent to have voluntary control over everything for which she is held responsible. I also argue that the limited applicability of the distinction between “bad agents” and “blameworthy agents” on these accounts is in fact a mark in their favor. (shrink)

This paper compares tracking and phenomenal intentionality theories of intentionality with respect to the issue of naturalism. Tracking theories explicitly aim to naturalize intentionality, while phenomenal intentionality theories generally do not. It might seem that considerations of naturalism count in favor of tracking theories. We survey key considerations relevant to this claim, including some motivations for and objections to the two kinds of theories. We conclude by suggesting that naturalistic considerations may in fact support phenomenal intentionality theories over tracking theories.

The concept of ‘ownership’ is increasingly central to debates, in the media, health policy and bioethics, about the appropriate management of clinical data. I argue that the language of ownership acts as a metaphor and reflects multiple concerns about current data use and the disenfranchisement of citizens and collectives in the existing data ecosystem. But exactly which core interests and concerns ownership claims allude to remains opaque. Too often, we jump straight from ‘ownership’ to ‘private property’ and conclude ‘the data (...) belongs to the patient’. I will argue here that private property is only one type of relevant relationship between people, communities and data. There are several reasons to doubt that conceptualising data as private property presents a compelling response to concerns about clinical data ownership. In particular I argue that clinical data are co-constructed, so a property account would fail to confer exclusive rights to the patient. A non-property account of ownership acknowledges that the data are ‘about the patient’, and therefore the patient has relevant interests, without jumping to the conclusion that the data ‘belongs to the patient’. On this broader account of ownership, the relevant harm is the severing of the connection between the patient and their data, and the solution is to re-engage and re-connect patients to the data research enterprise. (shrink)

Despite the recent proliferation of scientific, clinical, and narrative accounts of auditory verbal hallucinations, the phenomenology of voice hearing remains opaque and undertheorized. In this article, we outline an interdisciplinary approach to understanding hallucinatory experiences which seeks to demonstrate the value of the humanities and social sciences to advancing knowledge in clinical research and practice. We argue that an interdisciplinary approach to the phenomenology of AVH utilizes rigorous and context-appropriate methodologies to analyze a wider range of first-person accounts of AVH (...) at 3 contextual levels: cultural, social, and historical; experiential; and biographical. We go on to show that there are significant potential benefits for voice hearers, clinicians, and researchers. These include informing the development and refinement of subtypes of hallucinations within and across diagnostic categories; “front-loading” research in cognitive neuroscience; and suggesting new possibilities for therapeutic intervention. In conclusion, we argue that an interdisciplinary approach to the phenomenology of AVH can nourish the ethical core of scientific enquiry by challenging its interpretive paradigms, and offer voice hearers richer, potentially more empowering ways to make sense of their experiences. (shrink)

Augustine’s Confessions has been traditionally considered one of the founding texts in the genre of autobiographical writings. It belongs, in particular, to those specific autobiographical writings that their authors feel the need to write so as to defend their reputation, in the face of their critics. As part of their defence, what becomes important for these texts is that they communicate the truths of their authors. The problem in the case of the Confessions is that a number of scholars challenge (...) Augustine’s truth claims by portraying him in a less sympathetic light. Given these challenges, an alternative way of reading the text is to displace the focus of the reading from that of its author to the effects the text is intended to have upon its readers. In this way, the Confessions is read as a narrative that aims to convert its readers towards the Christian vision of salvation which Augustine, as a rhetorician, crafts using a number of episodes that his readers can identify with. These episodes drawn from everyday life are deployed so as to depict universal existential situations with the ultimate purpose of enabling his readers to realize that Christian salvation is attainable for all, irrespective of their failings. (shrink)

This target article considers the ethical implications of providing prenatal diagnosis (PND) and antenatal screening services to detect fetal abnormalities in jurisdictions that prohibit abortion for these conditions. This unusual health policy context is common in the Latin American region. Congenital conditions are often untreated or under-treated in developing countries due to limited health resources, leading many women/couples to prefer termination of affected pregnancies. Three potential harms derive from the provision of PND in the absence of legal and safe abortion (...) for these conditions: psychological distress, unjust distribution of burdens between socio-economic classes, and financial burdens for families and society. We present Iran as a comparative case study where recognition of these ethical issues has led to the liberalization of abortion laws for fetuses with thalassemia. We argue that physicians, geneticists and policymakers have an ethical and professional duty of care to advocate for change in order to ameliorate these harms. (shrink)

Abstract In slogan form, the thesis of this paper is that beliefs are self-verifying fictions: We make them up, but in so doing, they come to exist, and so the fiction of belief is in fact true. This picture of belief emerges from a combination of three independently motivated views: (1) a phenomenal intentionalist picture of intentionality, on which phenomenal consciousness is the basis of intentionality; (2) what I will call a “self-ascriptivist” picture of derived representation, on which non-fundamental representational (...) features are a matter of our ascribing contents to ourselves or our mental states or contents; and (3) a representationalist picture of the attitudes, on which the attitude components of mental states (e.g., the “belief” bit of a belief that P) are represented contents. This paper outlines and motivates the view of beliefs as self-verifying fictions, compares the view to alternative views of belief, and contrasts beliefs on the resulting picture to other belief-like mental states. (shrink)

Nowadays, novel techniques such as Reciprocal effortless in vitro fertilization (ReIVF) enable two individuals to “carry the same pregnancy,” that is to “carry” the same embryo in both their bodies. However, even though these techniques are likely to be increasingly requested, little is known about their safety and efficacy, and much less about their bioethical legitimacy and issues. Considering their uniqueness, this study assesses the compatibility of ReIVF as well as of another similar technique with the classical principles of medical (...) ethics: autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice. The aim is twofold: (i) to start investigating whether these techniques and their underlying reasons are, or could ever be, bioethically justifiable and (ii) to make clinicians and any other potentially interested persons such as researchers, lawmakers and prospective parents themselves are more aware of the health and social implications of using these techniques. Hence, after a brief overview of the technical aspects of the procedures that allow two persons to carry the same pregnancy, this study offers a general moral framework that can be useful for starting to address some relevant aspects of these procedures, such as their benefits and harms on the health of the individuals involved, the reasons behind their use, and the possibility that they might be covered by states in the future. Finally, this study provides a bioethical overview on ReIVF as well as on similar techniques considering different perspectives, while also suggesting some questions and recommendations for further research. (shrink)

We distinguish between different problems of “aboutness”: the “hard” problem of explaining the everyday phenomenon of intentionality and three less challenging “easy” sets of problems concerning the posits of folk psychology, the notions of representation invoked in the mind‐brain sciences, and the intensionality (with an “s”) of mental language. The problem of intentionality is especially hard in that, as is the case with the hard problem of phenomenal consciousness, there is no clear path to a solution using current methods. We (...) argue that naturalistic theories of mental representation do not address the hard problem—either they are only intended to address the easy problems, or the claims they make help address the problem of intentionality only under undefended andprima facieimplausible assumptions to the effect that the hard problem reduces to some combination of the easy problems. We offer a positive account of what would be required to properly face up to the problem of intentionality. (shrink)

The study applied the Natural Semantic Metalanguage to the investigation of pakikisama or ‘getting along with others’. The study aimed to use language in representing cognition and to identify the elements that make the concepts culture-specific. Hence, the study of a language, especially of its vocabulary, can reveal one’s way of thinking, show the essential features of a particular culture and offer important clues for its distinction from others. Using linguistic evidence as data, the study is a semantic analysis, a (...) type which falls under descriptive qualitative research. The native meanings of the concepts are couched in cultural scripts offering an objective representation through the use of semantic primitives or semantic primes. To date, there are 63 semantic primes which make possible the bias-free, culture-independent and non-ethnocentric description of the meaning and its comparison with related concepts in other languages. The study includes a semantic explication which reveals the Filipinos’ unique way of looking at things by demonstrating their dominantly inherent ‘group’ cognitive structures. The study recommends that the concepts be compared with those from other ethnolinguistic groups in order to promote goodwill and understanding among people of diverse cultural types. Keywords- Social Science, semantics, key cultural concepts, Natural Semantic Metalanguage, Philippines. (shrink)

One of the central aims of science is explanation: scientists seek to uncover why things happen the way they do. This chapter addresses what kinds of explanations are formulated in biology, how explanatory aims influence other features of the field of biology, and the implications of all of this for biology education. Philosophical treatments of scientific explanation have been both complicated and enriched by attention to explanatory strategies in biology. Most basically, whereas traditional philosophy of science based explanation on derivation (...) from scientific laws, there are many biological explanations in which laws play little or no role. Instead, the field of biology is a natural place to turn for support for the idea that causal information is explanatory. Biology has also been used to motivate mechanistic accounts of explanation, as well as criticisms of that approach. Ultimately, the most pressing issue about explanation in biology may be how to account for the wide range of explanatory styles encountered in the field. This issue is crucial, for the aims of biological explanation influence a variety of other features of the field of biology. Explanatory aims account for the continued neglect of some central causal factors, a neglect that would otherwise be mysterious. This is linked to the persistent use of models like evolutionary game theory and population genetic models, models that are simplified to the point of unreality. These explanatory aims also offer a way to interpret many biologists’ total commitment to one or another methodological approach, and the intense disagreements that result. In my view, such debates are better understood as arising not from different theoretical commitments, but commitments to different explanatory projects. Biology education would thus be enriched by attending to approaches to biological explanation, as well as the unexpected ways that these explanatory aims influence other features of biology. I suggest five lessons for teaching about explanation in biology that follow from the considerations of this chapter. (shrink)

Like many corporations, the Catholic Church in the United States and Ireland has tried to move beyond scandal. In this case, the scandal was the failure of church leaders to protect minors from clergy sexual abuse, particularly in Boston and Dublin. Like corporate leaders, church leaders have faced the challenge of restoring trust after scandal. Influenced by corporate trends toward codes of conduct, the archdioceses of both Boston and Dublin provide codes of conduct, but the differences between them are worth (...) noting. In 2015, the Catholic Church in both the United States and Ireland highlighted the need for a culture of accountability that does not succumb to complacency, and in the United States the bishops have once again been encouraged to learn from business. This paper will demonstrate that the Catholic Church is in dialogue with and learns from codes of conduct and cultural practices in business. At the same time, it will highlight that the Catholic Church must also be attentive to its own mission since a simple adoption of other corporations’ practices can be detrimental to sharing the Gospel. The appropriation of codes of conduct and cultural practices from business reflects the church’s attentiveness to the signs of the times, and this appropriation needs to be evaluated in the light of the church’s mission to share the Gospel with the world. (shrink)

Analyzes the dynamics involved in the act of communication in order to highlight its context of production, reception, and effects, providing a framework for an analysis of selected theorists on the concept of communication.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Human Rights and Women's RightsAngela KnobelMainstream feminists insist, with a degree of unanimity that is sometimes surprising, that access to abortion is an essential precondition of female equality. That feminism, which is in other respects so flexible, inclusive, and uncategorizable, should be so unyielding with respect to this particular issue seems surprising to many. It is especially surprising to those who, while sympathetic to other feminist goals, also oppose (...) abortion.1 Why is access to abortion so important? Why must one's views about the equality of women stand or fall on one's views about the value of unborn human life? If feminism has to have a flagship issue, why must that issue be abortion? In this paper, I will propose that Pierre Manent's Natural Law and Human Rights offers a possible answer to this question. I will argue that, to the extent that mainstream feminism assumes the truth of what Manent calls the "philosophy of human rights," it cannot not advocate abortion access. Similarly, I will argue that pro-life feminist attempts to defend the contrary position—namely, that abortion is antithetical to feminism—invariably assume the natural law that the philosophy of human rights rejects. My argument, if correct, suggests the pivot point in discussions of abortion and feminism occurs much further back than many acknowledge: in our very understanding of ourselves and our place in the world.In what follows I will first briefly summarize Manent's account of what he calls the "philosophy of human rights." With this background in place, [End Page 275] I will consider the mainstream feminist claim that access to abortion is a necessary precondition of female equality. When "equality" is understood through the lens of the philosophy of human rights, I argue, the mainstream feminist insistence on access to abortion becomes coherent: a feminism that assumes the truth of the philosophy of human rights cannot not insist on access to abortion. The pro-life feminist reply that abortion harms and oppresses women, by contrast, is coherent only to the extent one assumes the framework of natural law.2Natural Law or Human Rights?To believe in natural law is to believe that nature itself sets the standard for human life. What the "law" commands is simply action necessary for the realization of the potential implicit in our nature. Under such a framework, Manent notes, "natural inclinations and natural differences, if they exist, constitute a kind of language of nature."3 The fact that human beings are naturally rational or naturally social, or that biological males are (typically) attracted to biological women, helps provide insight into nature's "law": "Natural law issued commands in the name of a teaching implicit in human nature, in a tendency of human nature to society and to knowledge, or in a natural difference among ages, sexes, and capacities, a tendency or difference that reason once made explicit and on the basis of which it founded its commandments and recommendations."4 Nature's laws can be and frequently are violated: cultures or individuals can choose to live up to nature's laws or not. For this reason, Manent says that, under the traditional framework of natural law, human beings are "free under the law."5 Natural law is something we freely choose to follow or freely choose to reject, but because it stems from our human nature, it does not cease to bind even those who reject it.The philosophy of human rights, by contrast, accepts the notion of freedom but rejects the notion of any overarching "law" against which our free choices are to be measured. While the philosophy of natural law is rooted in the language of nature, and thus sees human beings as free "under the law" of nature, the philosophy of human rights puts freedom prior to [End Page 276] law and recognizes law only as a means of preserving freedom.6 While the philosophy of natural law understands individual human beings in terms of their human nature, and thus in terms of their natural inclinations and natural differences, the philosophy of human rights rejects the language of "nature" in favor of an "impoverished common denominator," namely equality... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Rights of Women: Reclaiming a Lost Vision by Erika BachiochiAngela KnobelThe Rights of Women: Reclaiming a Lost Vision by Erika Bachiochi (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2021), 422 pp.Erika Bachiochi's The Rights of Women is animated by a clear vision: a vision of men and women as possessors of the same nature and engaged in the same shared enterprise. Men and women possess the (...) same nature because they are rational animals and hence fulfilled by living a life that exhibits the fullness of their rational human nature, and they are engaged in the same enterprise because both naturally pursue the same good: the common good of their families and societies. Bachiochi argues that this Aristotelian and communitarian understanding of the relationship between the sexes was the original vision of feminism: it was the vision of the early feminist Mary [End Page 742] Wollenstonecraft, and likewise the vision that inspired and animated our nation's founding mothers. As feminism's most famous advocates began to adopt the language of the Enlightenment and its incoherent emphasis on "rights," however, Wollenstonecraft's robust and sensible understanding of the right relationship between the sexes was gradually left behind. Modern feminism, Bachiochi argues, needs to reclaim Wollenstonecraft's vision, and has indeed already begun to do so in the communitarian and dignitarian work of Mary Ann Glendon.As is evident from the preceding, there are three distinct claims advanced in Bachiochi's book. First—and this I take to be the overarching thesis of the book—there is a claim about how feminism ought to understand the relationship between the sexes (i.e., in terms of Aristotelian flourishing and natural law). Second, there is the claim that feminism originally did understand the relationship between the sexes in this way. Finally (this is the third thesis), there is the claim that modern feminists have lost this vision, and that the solution to our current woes is to reclaim it. It is important to notice that truth of the first thesis does not depend on the truth of the second or the third, or vice versa. Because the first thesis is to my mind the most interesting and important of the three, it will be the focus of my remarks here. But it is worth making a few brief remarks about the other two theses, if only because so much of the book's content is devoted them.Did early feminists have a clear vision of the right relationship between the sexes, a vision informed by Aristotle and natural law? Did later feminists discard that clear vision? Is Enlightenment philosophy to blame? This is a common narrative, particularly in pro-life circles, and I think there is certainly an element of truth to it. I think Bachiochi rightly recognizes an Aristotelian strain in Wollenstonecraft, and rightly applauds the early feminist advocacy of virtue. What I am not quite ready to accept, though, is the "clear" part of the clear vision. Early feminists subscribed to many admirable views. They also seem to have held some less admirable ones. However laudable her advocacy of virtue and chastity may have been, for instance, Wollenstonecraft seems to have had a very dim view of men (45). Similarly, I found the "voluntary motherhood" movement, which Bachiochi applauds, repellent. If disharmony between the sexes arose from men having too much control over women's sexual lives, harmony will hardly be restored by reversing the equation and instead giving women complete control over sex (109). My own instinct (which this book only reaffirmed) is to think that feminism as a movement has always been a bit confused, has always had some good goals and some that were less so. I think this, in [End Page 743] part, because I am not sure that a coherent "feminism" is possible. I shall say more about this below.Bachiochi's real claim, of course, is that there is a right way to understand men and women, and consequently a right way to be a feminist. But my genuine appreciation for and affirmation of her view of what the right relationship between the... (shrink)

In der hoch aktuellen und international geführten Debatte um Klimagerechtigkeit präsentiert der Band die einschlägigen Positionen erstmals in deutscher Sprache. Fachvertreter aus der Ethik, der politischen Philosophie und den Klimawissenschaften diskutieren Prinzipien fairer Verteilungen, zukunftsweisende Kooperationsmodelle angesichts des globalen Klimawandels und ethische Reaktionen auf Vorschläge des Klima-Engineering.

Sex work’s governance throughout the Commonwealth has historically been animated by the objective of rendering the sale of sex, and those who engage in such transactions, invisible. To achieve this end, lawmakers have characterized public, viewable sex work as a nuisance meriting criminalization. Although prohibition results in unequivocal perils for sex workers, governance strategies in this domain remain centred on criminalization. A new law in Canada, Bill C-36: the Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act, exemplifies this point. While Bill (...) C-36 purports to shift criminal law’s focus from sex workers to their clients and profiteers, it continues to expose sex workers who work in public view to criminal prosecution. It thereby preserves sex work’s characterization as a nuisance, offensive to a community’s senses and deserving of proscription. Although Bill C-36 proclaims to promote dignity and equality rights, it prioritizes the interests of communities over those of sex workers. In the result, this new law will revoke sex workers’ social and political citizenship and thwart their personal security. (shrink)

En este artículo se analiza la importancia del trabajo textil realizado por las mujeres en la Grecia antigua. Se presentarán algunos pasajes homéricos para guiar el reconocimiento del concepto de unas manos pensantes en el que una actividad teórico-práctica es capaz de transmitir poderosos mensajes no hablados desde la vulnerabilidad de lo femenino que, al contrario de lo que tradicionalmente podría pensarse, tienen una dimensión política. Para ello se procederá en tres apartados. En el primero, se indicará el modo en (...) que el trabajo manual puede ser comprendido como ejercicio intelectual en el mundo griego; en el segundo, se revisará cómo el tejido se entiende desde lo humano y la manera en la que Atenea es símbolo de la textilidad que reviste a lo humano, y en el tercero se afirma que la práctica del tejido es una forma idónea de reivindicación de la figura femenina. Finalmente, la conclusión muestra cómo esta práctica sigue vigente hoy. (shrink)

The phenomenological movement originates with Edmund Husserl, and two of his young students and collaborators, Edith Stein and Hedwig Conrad-Martius, made a notable contribution to the very delineation of the phenomenological method, which pushed phenomenology in a “realistic” direction. This essay seeks to examine the decisive influence that these two thinkers had on two specific areas: the value of the sciences and certain metaphysical questions. Concerningthe former, I maintain that Stein, departing from a philosophical, phenomenological analysis of the human being, (...) is interested particularly in the formation of the cognitive value of the human sciences. Regarding the latter, Conrad-Martius, given her knowledge of biology, tackled the question of the role and meaning of the sciences of nature. The second question, related to metaphysical themes, became a specific and relevant object of research for both women phenomenologists.It will be investigated by comparing two works, one by each thinker, namely, the Metaphysische Gespräche by Conrad-Martius and Potenz und Akt by Edith Stein. (shrink)

Placing Aristotle’s ethical works in dialogue with the work of G.E.M. Anscombe, this paper outlines a functional definition of emotions that describes a meta-theory for social-scientific research. Emotions are defined as what makes the thought and action of rational and political animals ethical.

Explores the interplay between artistic values and social, political, and moral concerns in writings by African American and Native American women.

Voici l'esquisse d'un rapport existant entre la conception du bonheur de Kant et celle de Montaigne, telle qu'elle émane de la conviction qu'ils partagent, qu'une sorte de métaphysique se forme chez tous les êtres humains " dès que leur raison peut s'élever à la spéculation ". Ce qui, chez Kant, s'appelle les idées a priori correspond, chez Montaigne, aux outils et instrumens que tous les êtres humains possèdent pour penser. À l'encontre des théories qui présupposent l'inadéquation de la philosophie à (...) la " souffrance de l'espèce humaine " qu'elle est néanmoins censée guérir, nous considérons le sens que la metaphysica naturalis peut acquérir - lorsque nous nous engageons vis-à-vis la philosophie, ou lorsque la philosophie nous engage - à partir de la position selon laquelle ce qu'il y a de plus philosophique, de plus métaphysique en nous, nous vient des animaux. Cette métaphysique, fondée sur la question du rapport véritable au présent, nous ramène à M. de Charlus, spécialiste de la digestion philosophique. C'est à travers ses propos énigmatiques, chargés de paraboles concernant sa tante Esther de Mecklembourg, que nous verrons le rapport à l'histoire et à la transcendance acquérir les vertus d'une animot-thérapie. (shrink)

Information and communication technologies (ICT) enable citizens to communicate across state borders with greater ease than ever before, exciting much speculation about the emergence of transnational public spheres. This highly original work introduces this debate to International Relations, by investigating the socio-political implications of ICT in a global governance framework. Classic Habermasian theory is radically reconstructed to take account of contemporary trends in state sovereignty and global civil society. It is argued that if access is not widened and free speech (...) not sufficiently protected, the early promise of ICT as a liberating force will be neutralized. (shrink)

Both autonomy and local specificity are compatible with observed interconnectivity at the cell level when considering two different levels: cell assemblies and brain systems. Early syntactic structuring processes in particular are likely to representan autonomous module in the language/brain system.

Although scholars agree that Aquinas believed the pagan could possess “true but imperfect” virtues, there is deep disagreement over the question of how these “true but imperfect” virtues should be understood. Some scholars argue that Aquinas believed the pagan’s imperfect virtues are nonetheless ordered to a genuinely good end (his natural good) and are connected by acquired prudence. Other scholars argue that Aquinas believed that any virtues that the pagan possesses are considerably more limited: they are more akin to dispositions (...) than habits, and they are not connected. This paper argues that this latter position is incoherent. If one is willing to concede that the pagan can perform genuinely good actions, then one must concede that the pagan can possess genuine (albeit imperfect) virtues that are connected by acquired prudence. (shrink)

Although it is well known that Aquinas holds that infused versions of prudence and the other acquired virtues are bestowed on man along with habitual grace, there is no uniform and widely accepted account of how the infused and acquired virtues are related: some scholars interpret Aquinas to mean that the acquired virtues are ‘taken up’ into the infused virtues, while others credit him with the view that the infused and acquired virtues somehow coexist. This paper explores one common way (...) of maintaining that the Christian’s infused and acquired virtues ‘coexist’. I argue that while such an interpretation is able to accommodate some of Aquinas’s most fundamental claims about the infused and acquired virtues, it is also problematic in important respects. (shrink)

Il pensiero di Jonas, in particolare quello della sua seconda fase, dedicato alla filosofia della biologia, apre nel confronto filosofico con la scienza nuovi spazi di riflessione critica per la filosofia e per le scienze stesse. In tale incontro entrambe si arricchiscono, acquisendo maggior coscienza metodologica e ampliando le prospettive di osservazione dei fenomeni. Sorge, così, in modo rinnovato, la possibilità di nuove soluzioni interpretative, che, ponendosi al di là di desueti schieramenti ideologici, riescano a comprendere più in profondità la (...) complessità della realtà epocale a cui ci troviamo di fronte e dunque aumentino la capacità di governarla. (shrink)